in any way
represent itself as a new building, not even as the mere extension of an
old building, but as a complicated rebuilding, and by no means in
harmony with former styles, because neither Augustine nor Luther ever
dreamed of building independently.[8] This perception leads us to the
most peculiar phenomenon which meets the historian of dogma, and which
must determine his method.

Dogmas arise, develop themselves and are made serviceable to new aims;
this in all cases takes place through Theology. But Theology is
dependent on innumerable factors, above all, on the spirit of the time;
for it lies in the nature of theology that it desires to make its object
intelligible. Dogmas are the product of theology, not inversely; of a
theology of course which, as a rule, was in correspondence with the
faith of the time. The critical view of history teaches this: first we
have the Apologists and Origen, then the councils of Nice and Chalcedon;
first the Scholastics, then the Council of Trent. In consequence of
this, dogma bears the mark of all, the factors on which the theology was
dependent. That is one point. But the moment in which the product of
theology became dogma, the way which led to it must be obscured; for,
according to the conception of the Church, dogma can be nothing else
than the revealed faith itself. Dogma is regarded not as the exponent,
but as the basis of theology, and therefore the product of theology
having passed into dogma limits, and criticises the work of theology
both past and future.[9] That is the second point. It follows from this
that the history of the Christian religion embraces a very complicated
relation of ecclesiastical dogma and theology, and that the
ecclesiastical conception of the significance of theology cannot at all
do justice to this significance. The ecclesiastical scheme which is here
formed and which denotes the utmost concession that can be made to
history, is to the effect that theology gives expression only to the
form of dogma, while so far as it is ecclesiastical theology, it
presupposes the unchanging dogma, i.e., the substance of dogma. But this
scheme, which must always leave uncertain what the form really is, and
what the substance, is in no way applicable to the actual circumstances.
So far, however, as it is itself an article of faith it is an object of
the history of dogma. Ecclesiastical dogma when put on its defence must
at all times take up an ambiguous position t