lf to see and hear--such a child
shows plainly to the attentive observer that long before knowledge of
the word as a means of understanding among men, and long before the
first successful attempt to express himself in articulate words--nay,
long before learning the pronunciation of even a single word, he
combines ideas in a logical manner--i. e., he _thinks_. Thinking is,
it is true, "internal speech," but there is a speech without words.

Facts in proof of this have already been given in connection with
other points (Vol. I, pp. 88, 327, 328); others are given further on.

It will not be superfluous, however, to put together several
observations relating to the development of the childish intellect
without regard to the acquirement of speech; and to present them
separately, as a sort of introduction to the investigation of the
process of learning to speak.

Memory; a causative combination of the earliest recollections, or
memory-images; purposive, deliberate movements for the lessening of
individual strain--all these come to the child in greater or less
measure independently of verbal language. The, as it were, embryonic
logic of the child does not need words. A brief explanation of the
operation of these three factors will show this. Memory takes the
first place in point of time.

Without memory no intellect is possible. The only material at the
disposal of the intellect is received from the senses. It has been
provided solely out of sensations. Now a sensation in itself alone, as
a simple fundamental experience affecting primarily the one who has
the sensation, can not be the object of any intellectual operation
whatever. In order to make such activity possible there must be
several sensations: two of different kinds, of unequal strength; or
two of different kinds, of the same strength; or two of the same kind
unequally strong; in any case, two unlike sensations (cf. my treatise
"Elemente der reinen Empfindungslehre," Jena, 1876), if the lowest
activity of the intellect, _comparison_, is to operate. But because
the sensations that are to be compared can not all exist together,
recollection of the earlier ones is necessary (for the comparison);
that is, individual or personal memory.

This name I give to the memory formed by means of individual impressions
(occurrences, experiences) in contrast with the _phyletic_ memory, or
instinct, the memory of the race, which results from the inheritance of
the traces of in