ng martial law at New Orleans, nor assumed any authority which
was not "fully authorized and legalized by his position, his duty, and
the unavoidable necessity of the case." The House was used to these
dogmatic reiterations. But Douglas struck into untrodden ways when he
contended, that even if Jackson had violated the laws and the
Constitution, his condemnation for contempt of court was "unjust,
irregular and illegal." Every unlawful act is not necessarily a
contempt of court, he argued. "The doctrine of contempts only applies
to those acts which obstruct the proceedings of the court, and against
which the general laws of the land do not afford adequate
protection.... It is incumbent upon those who defend and applaud the
conduct of the judge to point out the specific act done by General
Jackson which constituted a contempt of court. The mere declaration of
martial law is not of that character.... It was a matter over which
the civil tribunals had no jurisdiction, and with which they had no
concern, unless some specific crime had been committed or injury done;
and not even then until it was brought before them according to the
forms of law."[166]

The old hero had never had a more adroit counsel. Like a good lawyer,
Douglas seemed to feel himself in duty bound to spar for every
technical advantage, and to construe the law, wherever possible, in
favor of his client. At the same time he did not forget that the House
was the jury in this case, and capable of human emotions upon which he
might play. At times he became declamatory beyond the point of good
taste. In voice and manner he betrayed the school in which he had been
trained. "When I hear gentlemen," he cried in strident tones,
"attempting to justify this unrighteous fine upon General Jackson upon
the ground of non-compliance with rules of court and mere formalities,
I must confess that I cannot appreciate the force of the argument. In
cases of war and desolation, in times of peril and disaster, we should
look at the substance and not the shadow of things. I envy not the
feelings of the man who can reason coolly and calmly about the force
of precedents and the tendency of examples in the fury of the war-cry,
when 'booty and beauty' is the watchword. Talk not to me about rules
and forms in court when the enemy's cannon are pointed at the door,
and the flames encircle the cupola! The man whose stoicism would
enable him to philosophize coolly under these circumstances w