the Boers, who were in
full retreat towards the Biggarsberg. Sir George White had made careful
inquiries among the regiments for men who would undertake to walk five
miles and fight at the end of the march. But so reduced were the
soldiers through want of food that, though many volunteered, only two
thousand men were considered fit out of the whole garrison. These were,
however, formed into a column, under Colonel Knox, consisting of two
batteries of artillery, two squadrons of the 19th Hussars and 5th
Lancers, 'all that was left of them,' with horses, and detachments, each
about two hundred and fifty strong, from the Manchester, Liverpool, and
Devon Regiments, the 60th Rifles, and the Gordon Highlanders, and this
force moved out of Ladysmith at dawn on the 1st to attack the Boers on
Pepworth's Hill, in the hope of interfering with their entrainment at
Modderspruit Station.

The Dutch, however, had left a rear guard sufficient to hold in check so
small a force, and it was 2 o'clock before Pepworth's Hill was occupied.
The batteries then shelled Modderspruit Station, and very nearly caught
three crowded trains, which just managed to steam out of range in time.
The whole force of men and horses was by this time quite exhausted. The
men could scarcely carry their rifles. In the squadron of 19th Hussars
nine horses out of sixty fell down and died, and Colonel Knox therefore
ordered the withdrawal into the town.

Only about a dozen men were killed or wounded in this affair, but the
fact that the garrison was capable of making any offensive movement
after their privations is a manifest proof of their soldierly spirit and
excellent discipline.

On the same morning Sir Redvers Buller advanced on Bulwana Hill. Down
from the commanding positions which they had won by their courage and
endurance marched the incomparable infantry, and by 2 o'clock the plain
of Pieters was thickly occupied by successive lines of men in extended
order, with long columns of guns and transport trailing behind them.
Shortly before noon it was ascertained that Bulwana Hill was abandoned
by the enemy, and the army was thereon ordered to camp in the plain, no
further fighting being necessary.

The failure to pursue the retreating Boers when two fine cavalry
brigades were standing idle and eager must be noticed. It is probable
that the Boer rearguard would have been sufficiently strong to require
both infantry and guns to drive it back. It is certain th