behind the
first row of positions, which practically runs along the edge of an
unbroken line of steep flat-topped hills, there is a second row standing
back from the edge at no great distance. Any attack on this second row
the Artillery cannot support, because from the plain below they are too
far off to find the Boer guns, and from the edge they are too close to
the enemy's riflemen. The ground is too broken, in the opinion of many
generals, for night operations. Therefore the attacking Infantry of
insufficient strength must face unaided the fire of cool, entrenched
riflemen, armed with magazine weapons and using smokeless powder.

Nevertheless, so excellent is the quality of the Infantry that if the
whole force were launched in attack it is not impossible that they would
carry everything before them. But after this first victory it will be
necessary to push on and attack the Boers investing Ladysmith. The line
of communications must be kept open behind the relieving army or it will
be itself in the most terrible danger. Already the Boers' position
beyond Potgieter's laps around us on three sides. What if we should
break through, only to have the door shut behind us? At least two
brigades would have to be left to hold the line of communications. The
rest, weakened by several fierce and bloody engagements, would not be
strong enough to effect the relief.

The idea of setting all on the turn of the battle is very grateful and
pleasant to the mind of the army, which only asks for a decisive trial
of strength, but Sir Redvers Buller has to remember that his army,
besides being the Ladysmith Relief Column, is also the only force which
can be spared to protect South Natal. Is he, therefore, justified in
running the greatest risks? On the other hand, how can we let Ladysmith
and all its gallant defenders fall into the hands of the enemy? It is
agonising to contemplate such a conclusion to all the efforts and
sacrifices that have been made. I believe and trust we shall try again.
As long as there is fighting one does not reflect on this horrible
situation. I have tried to explain some of the difficulties which
confront the General. I am not now concerned with the attempts that
have been made to overcome them. A great deal is incomprehensible, but
it may be safely said that if Sir Redvers Buller cannot relieve
Ladysmith with his present force we do not know of any other officer in
the British Service who would be likely to su