battalions sheltered, and which, though they did not cause a
greater loss than forty men on the 22nd and twenty-five on the 23rd,
nevertheless made their position extremely uncomfortable. It was quite
evident that the troops could not be fairly required to endure this
bombardment, against which there was no protection, indefinitely. Nor
was any good object, but rather the contrary, to be gained by waiting.

Three alternatives presented themselves to the council of war held on
the 22nd. First, to attack the second Boer position frontally along the
crest by moonlight. This would involve a great slaughter and a terrible
risk. Secondly, to withdraw again, beyond the Tugela, and look elsewhere
for a passage: a moral defeat and a further delay in the relief of
Ladysmith; and thirdly, to attack by night the mountain of Spion Kop,
and thence to enfilade and command the Boer entrenchments. Sir Redvers
Buller, who has always disdained effect, was for the second
course--unpalatable as it must have been to a fearless man; miserable as
it is to call off infantry after they have made sacrifices and won
positions, and to call them off a second time. The discussion was an
informal one, and no votes were taken, but the General yielded to the
advice of his subordinate, rightly, I hold, because now at least we know
the strength of the enemy's position, whereas before we only dreaded it;
and knowledge is a better reason for action than apprehension.

It was therefore decided to attack Spion Kop by night, rush the Boer
trenches with the bayonet, entrench as far as possible before dawn, hold
on during the day, drag guns up at night, and thus dominate the Boer
lines. There is, of course, no possible doubt that Spion Kop is the key
of the whole position, and the reader has only to think of the
horizontal note of interrogation, and remember that the mountain at the
angle divides, commands, and enfilades the enemy's lines, to appreciate
this fact. The questions to be proved were whether the troops could hold
out during the day, and whether the place could be converted into a fort
proof against shell fire and armed with guns during the following night.
Fate has now decided both.

General Woodgate was entrusted with the command, and Colonel
Thorneycroft with much of the arrangement and direction of the night
attack. It does not seem that anything but good resulted from this too
soon broken co-operation. Thorneycroft declined to attack on the nigh