ch important business
was toward, which the reader may easily understand by studying the map,
but cannot without such attention.

Having placed his army within striking distance of the various passages
across the Tugela, Sir Redvers Buller's next object was to cross and
debouch. To this end his plan appears to have been--for information is
scarcely yet properly codified--something as follows: Lyttelton's
Brigade, the corps troops forming Coke's Brigade, the ten naval guns,
the battery of howitzers, one field battery, and Bethune's Mounted
Infantry to demonstrate in front of the Potgieter position, keeping the
Boers holding the horseshoe in expectation of a frontal attack, and
masking their main position; Sir Charles Warren to march by night from
Springfield with the brigades of Hart, Woodgate, and Hildyard, the Royal
Dragoons, six batteries of artillery, and the pontoon train to a point
about five miles west of Spearman's Hill, and opposite Trichardt's Drift
on the Tugela. Here he was to meet the mounted forces from Spearman's
Hill, and with these troops he was next day, the 17th, to throw bridges,
force the passage of the river, and operate at leisure and discretion
against the right flank of the enemy's horseshoe before Potgieter's,
resting on Spion Kop, a commanding mountain, ultimately joining hands
with the frontal force from Spearman's Hill at a point on the Acton
Homes-Ladysmith road. To sum up briefly, seven battalions, twenty-two
guns, and three hundred horse under Lyttelton to mask the Potgieter
position; twelve battalions, thirty-six guns, and sixteen hundred horse
to cross five miles to the westward, and make a turning movement against
the enemy's right. The Boer covering army was to be swept back on
Ladysmith by a powerful left arm, the pivoting shoulder of which was at
Potgieter's, the elbow at Trichardt's Drift, and the enveloping
hand--the cavalry under Lord Dundonald--stretching out towards Acton
Homes.

So much for the plan; now for its execution or modifications. One main
feature has characterised the whole undertaking--its amazing
deliberation. There was to be absolutely no hurry of any kind whatever.
Let the enemy entrench and fortify. If necessary, we were prepared to
sap up to his positions. Let him discover where the attack impended.
Even then all his resistance should be overborne. And it seems now that
this same deliberation which was so punctiliously observed, when speed
appeared an essentia