emony, Mr. President,' said General Wool; 'Norfolk is ours!' Stanton
here burst in, just out of bed, clad in a long night-gown which nearly
swept the floor, his ear catching, as he crossed the threshold, Wool's
last words. Perfectly overjoyed, he rushed at the General, whom he
hugged most affectionately, fairly lifting him from the floor in his
delight. The scene altogether must have been a comical one, though at
the time we were all too greatly excited to take much note of mere
appearances."

Lincoln's general grasp of military strategy, and his keen understanding
of the specific problems confronting the Army of the Potomac in the
critical autumn of 1862, are well indicated in the following
communication to General McClellan:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
October 13, 1862

MY DEAR SIR:--You remember my speaking to you of what I called your
over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that
you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not
claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot
subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's
Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now
subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great
from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the
railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court-House,
which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from
Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided
with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to
have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to
Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to
you, and, in fact, ignores the question of _time_, which cannot and
must not be ignored.

Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is, "to
operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible,
without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies
_against_ you, but cannot apply in your _favor_. Change positions
with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication
with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his
going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives
up his com