tical
mind had already grasped, more surely than had his would-be advisers,
the ultimate wisdom and justice of the emancipation of the slaves. But
he was resolved to do nothing rashly. He would wait till the time was
ripe, and then abolish slavery on grounds that would be approved
throughout the world: he would destroy slavery as a necessary step to
the preservation of the Union. In the first year of the war he had said
to a Southern Unionist, who warned him against meddling with slavery,
"_You must not expect me to give up this Government without playing my
last card._" This "last card" was undoubtedly the freeing of the slaves;
and when the time came, Lincoln played it unhesitatingly and
triumphantly. How strong a card it was may be judged by a statement made
in Congress by Mr. Ashmore, a Representative from South Carolina, who
said shortly before the war: "The South can sustain more men in the
field than the North can. _Her four millions of slaves alone will enable
her to support an army of half a million._" This view makes the issue
plain. If the South could maintain armies in the field supported, or
partly supported, by slave labor, it was as much the right and the duty
of the Government to destroy that support as to destroy an establishment
for the manufacture of arms or munitions of war for the Southern armies.
The logic of events had demonstrated the necessity and justice of the
measure, and Lincoln now had with him a Cabinet practically united in
its favor. The case was well stated by Secretary Welles--perhaps the
most cool-headed and conservative member of Lincoln's Cabinet--at a
Cabinet meeting held six or eight weeks after the Emancipation measure
had been brought forward by the President. Mr. Welles, as he relates in
his Diary, pointed out "the strong exercise of power" involved in the
proposal, and denied the power of the Executive to take such a step
under ordinary conditions. "But," said Mr. Welles, "the Rebels
themselves had invoked war on the subject of slavery, had appealed to
arms, and must abide the consequences." Mr. Welles admitted that it was
"an extreme exercise of war powers" which he believed justifiable "under
the circumstances, and in view of the condition of the country and the
magnitude of the contest. The slaves were now an element of strength to
the Rebels--were laborers, producers, and army attendants; they were
considered as _property_ by the Rebels, and _if property_ they were
subject