the end of our rope on the plan
of operations we had been pursuing; that we must change our tactics and
play our last card, or lose the game. I now determined upon the adoption
of the emancipation policy; and, without consultation with, or the
knowledge of, the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the
proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting
upon the subject. This was the last of July, or the first part of the
month of August, 1862. This Cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon a
Saturday. All were present excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster general,
who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in
subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step,
and had called them together, not to ask their advice, but to lay the
subject-matter of a proclamation before them; suggestions as to which
would be in order, after they had heard it read. Mr. Lovejoy was in
error when he informed you that it excited no comment, excepting on the
part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were offered. Secretary
Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the
blacks. Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy, on the
ground that it would cost the administration the fall elections.
Nothing, however, was offered that I had not already fully anticipated
and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in
substance: 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question
the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the
public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I
fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last
measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government
stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching
forth her hands to the government.' 'His idea,' said the President, 'was
that it would be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat.' (This was
his precise expression.) 'Now,' continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve
the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue until you can
give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing
it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war!'"
Lincoln continued: "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State
struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in
all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlo