revious report of some one of the
ex-governors of Zamboanga and the best informed missionaries, may be
enabled to deliberate and proceed on to a mature examination of the
whole affair, taking into their special consideration everything
regarding Jolo, its early reduction, the number of vessels and
men required for this purpose, the most advantageous points of
attack, and the best season in which this can be carried into
execution. After all these matters have been determined upon, the
operation in question ought to be connected with the other partial
and general arrangements of the government, in order that a plan the
best adapted to localities and existing circumstances may be chosen,
and without its being necessary to wait for the king's approbation
of the means resolved upon, owing to the distance of the court and
the necessity of acting with celerity. If, however, on account of
the deference in every respect due to the sovereign, it should be
thought proper to reconcile his previous sanction with the necessity
of acting without loss of time, the best mode would be to send from
Spain an officer of high rank, fully authorized, who, as practised
on other occasions, might give his sanction, in the name of the king,
to the resolutions adopted by the council of war, and take under his
own immediate charge, if it should be so deemed expedient, the command
of the expedition against Jolo, receiving the appointment of governor
of the Island, as soon as the conquest should be carried into effect,
as a just reward for his zeal and valor.

[War popular in Philippines.] Supposing an uniformity of opinions to
prevail with regard to the expediency of attempting the subjugation
of Jolo, and supposing also the existence of the necessary funds to
meet the expenses of a corresponding armament, it may be positively
relied upon that the project would be extremely popular, and meet
with the entire concurrence and support of the Philippine Islands. The
military men, aware of the great riches known to exist in the proposed
theatre of operations, would emulously come forward to offer their
services, under a hope of sharing the booty, and the warlike natives
of the Bisayas would be impelled on by their hatred to the Moros,
and their ardent wishes to avenge the blood of their fathers and
children. On the other hand, the abundance of regular and well
disciplined officers and troops, at present in the colony and the
number of gun-boats found in