at the Spaniards attempted,
though unsuccessfully, from a more distant part of the world, in the
pride of their American affluence, would certainly have been once more
endeavoured by France, with far greater advantages, and as it may be
imagined, with a different event.

That it would have been endeavoured, cannot be doubted, because the
endeavour would not have been hazardous; by once defeating our fleet,
they might land their forces, which might be wafted over in a very
short time, and by a single victory they might conquer all the island,
or that part of it, at least, which is most worth the labour of
conquest; and though they should be unsuccessful, they could suffer
nothing but the mortification of their pride, and would be in a short
time enabled to make a new attempt.

Thus, my lords, if we could preserve our liberty in the general
subjection of the western part of the world, we should do it only by
turning our island into a garrison, by laying aside all other
employment than the study of war, and by making it our only care to
watch our coasts: a state which surely ought to be avoided at almost
any expense and at any hazard.

To think that we could extend our trade or increase our riches in this
state of the continent, is to forget the effects of universal empire.
The French, my lords, would then be in possession of all the trade of
those provinces which they had conquered, they would be masters of all
their ports and of all their shipping; and your lordships may easily
conceive with what security we should venture upon the ocean, in a
state of war, when all the harbours of the continent afforded shelter
to our enemies. If the French privateers from a few obscure creeks,
unsupported by a fleet of war, or at least not supported by a navy
equal to our own, could make such devastations in our trade as enabled
their country to hold out against the confederacy of almost all the
neighbouring powers; what, my lords, might not be dreaded by us, when
every ship upon the ocean should be an enemy; when we should be at
once overborne by the wealth and the numbers of our adversaries; when
the trade of the world should be in their hands, and their navies no
less numerous than their troops.

I have made this digression, my lords, I hope not wholly without
necessity, to show that the advantages of preserving the equipoise of
Europe are not, as they have been sometimes conceived, empty sounds,
or idle notions; but that by th