ted by
any statute, and founded only upon immemorial usage. This question,
long agitated with great heat and resentment on both sides, became at
length the immediate cause of the fatal rupture between the king and
his parliament: the two houses not only denying this prerogative of
the crown, the legality of which right perhaps might be somewhat
doubtful; but also seizing into their own hands the intire power of
the militia, the illegality of which step could never be any doubt at
all.

SOON after the restoration of king Charles the second, when the
military tenures were abolished, it was thought proper to ascertain
the power of the militia, to recognize the sole right of the crown to
govern and command them, and to put the whole into a more regular
method of military subordination[m]: and the order, in which the
militia now stands by law, is principally built upon the statutes
which were then enacted. It is true the two last of them are
apparently repealed; but many of their provisions are re-enacted, with
the addition of some new regulations, by the present militia laws: the
general scheme of which is to discipline a certain number of the
inhabitants of every county, chosen by lot for three years, and
officered by the lord lieutenant, the deputy lieutenants, and other
principal landholders, under a commission from the crown. They are not
compellable to march out of their counties, unless in case of invasion
or actual rebellion, nor in any case compellable to march out of the
kingdom. They are to be exercised at stated times: and their
discipline in general is liberal and [Transcriber's Note: 'and'
missing here but is in printer's mark on previous page] easy; but,
when drawn out into actual service, they are subject to the rigours of
martial law, as necessary to keep them in order. This is the
constitutional security, which our laws have provided for the public
peace, and for protecting the realm against foreign or domestic
violence; and which the statutes[n] declare is essentially necessary
to the safety and prosperity of the kingdom.

[Footnote m: 13 Car. II. c. 6. 14 Car. II. c. 3. 15 Car. II. c. 4.]

[Footnote n: 30 Geo. II. c. 25, &c.]

WHEN the nation is engaged in a foreign war, more veteran troops and
more regular discipline may perhaps be necessary, than can be expected
from a mere militia. And therefore at such times particular provisions
have been usually made for the raising of armies and the due
regul