w; that is, the rule by which particular
districts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by
Justinian[d], "_jus civile est quod quisque sibi populus constituit_."
I call it _municipal_ law, in compliance with common speech; for, tho'
strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single
_municipium_ or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be
applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws
and customs.

[Footnote d: _Inst._ 1. 2. 1.]

MUNICIPAL law, thus understood, is properly defined to be "a rule of
civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding
what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." Let us endeavour to
explain it's several properties, as they arise out of this definition.

AND, first, it is a _rule_; not a transient sudden order from a
superior to or concerning a particular person; but something
permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the
legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of
high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the
operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation
to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But
an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be
deemed high treason; this has permanency, uniformity, and
universality, and therefore is properly a _rule_. It is also called a
_rule_, to distinguish it from _advice_ or _counsel_, which we are at
liberty to follow or not, as we see proper; and to judge upon the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing advised. Whereas our
obedience to the _law_ depends not upon _our approbation_, but upon
the _maker's will_. Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is
matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon the
unwilling also.

IT is also called a _rule_, to distinguish it from a _compact_ or
_agreement_; for a compact is a promise proceeding _from_ us, law is a
command directed _to_ us. The language of a compact is, "I will, or
will not, do this;" that of a law is, "thou shalt, or shalt not, do
it." It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with
it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the
original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves
determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do
it; in laws, we are obliged to act, wi