archy, with liberty to
constitute to themselves a new legislative power.

[Footnote h: On government, part 2. Sec. 212.]

HAVING thus cursorily considered the three usual species of
government, and our own singular constitution, selected and compounded
from them all, I proceed to observe, that, as the power of making laws
constitutes the supreme authority, so wherever the supreme authority
in any state resides, it is the right of that authority to make laws;
that is, in the words of our definition, _to prescribe the rule of
civil action_. And this may be discovered from the very end and
institution of civil states. For a state is a collective body,
composed of a multitude of individuals, united for their safety and
convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore
is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will. But,
inasmuch as political communities are made up of many natural persons,
each of whom has his particular will and inclination, these several
wills cannot by any _natural_ union be joined together, or tempered
and disposed into a lasting harmony, so as to constitute and produce
that one uniform will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwise
produced than by a _political_ union; by the consent of all persons to
submit their own private wills to the will of one man, or of one or
more assemblies of men, to whom the supreme authority is entrusted:
and this will of that one man, or assemblage of men, is in different
states, according to their different constitutions, understood to be
_law_.

THUS far as to the _right_ of the supreme power to make laws; but
farther, it is it's _duty_ likewise. For since the respective members
are bound to conform themselves to the will of the state, it is
expedient that they receive directions from the state declaratory of
that it's will. But since it is impossible, in so great a multitude,
to give injunctions to every particular man, relative to each
particular action, therefore the state establishes general rules, for
the perpetual information and direction of all persons in all points,
whether of positive or negative duty. And this, in order that every
man may know what to look upon as his own, what as another's; what
absolute and what relative duties are required at his hands; what is
to be esteemed honest, dishonest, or indifferent; what degree every
man retains of his natural liberty; what he has given up as the price
of the benefits of