n etwa durch eine grosse Ueberlegenheit ihrer Natur, sondern
trotz ihrer geringeren Anlage stellt sich ihre Thatkraft an sich ueber
die Unthaetigkeit der Anderen hinaus, gleichviel aus wie schoener Quelle
diese Passivitaet, aus wie schlechter jene Thaetigkeit fliesse."

_I.e._, active people, like Fortinbras, Bolingbroke, Alcibiades,
Octavius, says Gervinus, are placed in contrast, by Shakespeare, with
various characters who do not exhibit energetic activity. And happiness
and success, according to Shakespeare, are attained by individuals
possessing this active character, not at all owing to the superiority
of their nature; on the contrary, notwithstanding their inferior gifts,
the capacity of activity itself always gives them the advantage over
inactivity, quite independent of any consideration whether the
inactivity of some persons flows from excellent impulses and the
activity of others from bad ones. "Activity is good, inactivity is evil.
Activity transforms evil into good," says Shakespeare, according to
Gervinus. Shakespeare prefers the principle of Alexander (of Macedonia)
to that of Diogenes, says Gervinus. In other words, he prefers death and
murder due to ambition, to abstinence and wisdom.

According to Gervinus, Shakespeare believes that humanity need not set
up ideals, but that only healthy activity and the golden mean are
necessary in everything. Indeed, Shakespeare is so penetrated by this
conviction that, according to Gervinus's assertion, he allows himself to
deny even Christian morality, which makes exaggerated demands on human
nature. Shakespeare, as we read, did not approve of limits of duty
exceeding the intentions of nature. He teaches the golden mean between
heathen hatred to one's enemies and Christian love toward them (pp.
561, 562). How far Shakespeare was penetrated with this fundamental
principle of _reasonable moderation_, says Gervinus, can be seen from
the fact that he has the courage to express himself even against the
Christian rules which prompt human nature to the excessive exertion of
its powers. He did not admit that the limits of duties should exceed the
biddings of Nature. Therefore he preached a reasonable mean natural to
man, between Christian and heathen precepts, of love toward one's
enemies on the one hand, and hatred toward them on the other.

That one may do too much good (exceed the reasonable limits of good) is
convincingly proved by Shakespeare's words and examples. Thus