e illegal capture of a
vessel of 12 tons, of which he was the owner and master. The vessel,
called the _Fame_, was found by the brig _Glory_ in Twofold Bay.
Griffiths, the owner of the _Glory_, invited Laurie on board, and made
him prisoner. He then boarded the _Fame_, deprived her of charts and
compass, and amidst the shouts of his seamen fastened her to the tail of
the _Glory_. In this condition she was carried triumphantly towards
Launceston; but a storm arising, the _Glory_ encumbered by the _Fame_,
cast her adrift, when she was exposed to great danger. The prize-master
ran her on shore, and the party wrecked, after fourteen days journey
through the woods, reached George Town. The justification pleaded was
that the plaintiff had conveyed prisoners from Port Jackson, and was
liable to forfeiture; that he had embarked in an unlawful voyage, and
intended to visit Launceston to circulate forged paper. No proof of
these assertions was offered, and the jury granted L460 damages; a
verdict which the government found no occasion to disturb.

Mr. Gellibrand, upon the close of the action, was called to account for
mal-practice. Mr. Dawes, an attorney, presented a statement to the
governor, which was forwarded to Judge Pedder, who returned it as not
within his province. Mr. Alfred Stephen, therefore, brought the
complaint formally before the court, and moved that Gellibrand should be
struck off the rolls. The main question was this: whether a barrister
holding a general retainer could, without license, advise the opposite
party, or whether he could draw pleas for both. It was maintained by Mr.
Stephen, that the practice was dishonorable and dangerous: in the early
stages of a cause facts might become known to a barrister, which would
make him a formidable antagonist to his former client. He asserted that
whether the practice were common in England or not, it was detestable;
and if allowed, would compel him to relinquish the profession, "or seek
an honorable pittance elsewhere."

In the case of Laurie _v._ Griffiths, Mr. Gellibrand had drawn the pleas
for the plaintiff, and afterwards acted officially against him; he,
however, transferred the fee he received to Mr. Stephen, when he was
compelled to relinquish the cause. The profession, almost unanimously,
asserted that the custom of the English bar warranted the practice of
Gellibrand. The judge stated that he was not concluded by the custom of
the English bar, and that the co