and it was
assumed the British government would readily attend to representations
emanating from such a source. The scheme did not obtain the support it
merited, and the scattered colonial interests could never be combined
for a joint action. The partizans of Arthur ridiculed the plan, and it
came to nothing.

The constitutional act, which became law, July 25, 1828, to terminate
1836, but extended until now, differs in many of its provisions from the
last. The governor is president, and has a deliberative and casting
vote. The council is increased from five or seven to ten or fifteen; the
oath of secresy is abolished; drafts of acts are _gazetted_; a law
cannot be made by the crown or the governor alone; two-thirds of the
council must be present; although previous duties are confirmed, no new
tax can be imposed except for local purposes expressed in the bill;
ordinances must be conformable to English laws; all statutes in
operation at the date of the act were applied to the colony, all others
may be adopted. A member may draft a bill, which the governor must lay,
_verbatim_, on the council table, with his reasons for refusing to
propose it. A member may record his protest, and a majority is necessary
to pass a measure. The members are appointed by the crown, and vacancies
are filled up by the governor: they must be resident; _ex-officio_ they
are magistrates. The preliminary certificate of the chief justice,
required by the former act, is substituted by another clause, which
compels the council to reconsider a bill declared by the judge repugnant
to the laws of England, or the act constituting the council.

The British legislature, in criminal cases, establishes a military jury
alone: challenge is allowed for direct interests, and magistrates may
act in default of commissioned officers; but in civil actions assessors
are continued. But the local council is authorised to institute trial by
jury, under such limitations as may be deemed meet. It is under this act
of parliament that the colony has seen the jury-box delivered up to
civilians; but awaits the hour which the law itself foretells, when in
recognising the ancient principle of representation it records the
purpose of resuming it, "so soon as the cause shall cease to operate
which had forbidden its immediate observance."[154]

In transmitting this bill, Sir George Murray explained that by the
clause which superseded the veto of the chief justice, it was intended