by subsidies from
France; partly by captures, which might easily be made on that opulent
republic: that, in such a situation, attempts to recover the lost
authority of the crown would be attended with success; nor would
any malecontents dare to resist a prince fortified by so powerful an
alliance; or, if they did, they would only draw more certain ruin on
themselves and on their cause; and that by subduing the states, a great
step would be made towards a reformation of the government; since it was
apparent, that that republic, by its fame and grandeur, fortified in
his factious subjects their attachment to what they vainly termed their
civil and religious liberties.
These suggestions happened fatally to concur with all the inclinations
and prejudices of the king; his desire of more extensive authority, his
propensity to the Catholic religion, his avidity for money. He seems,
likewise, from the very beginning of his reign, to have entertained
great jealousy of his own subjects, and, on that account, a desire of
fortifying himself by an intimate alliance with France. So early as
1664, he had offered the French monarch to allow him without opposition
to conquer Flanders, provided that prince would engage to furnish him
with ten thousand infantry, and a suitable number of cavalry, in case
of any rebellion in England.[*] As no dangerous symptoms at that time
appeared, we are left to conjecture, from this incident, what opinion
Charles had conceived of the factious disposition of his people.
Even during the time when the triple alliance was the most zealously
cultivated, the king never seems to have been entirely cordial in those
salutary measures, but still to have cast a longing eye towards
the French alliance. Clifford, who had much of his confidence, said
imprudently, "Notwithstanding all this joy, we must have a second war
with Holland." The accession of the emperor to that alliance had been
refused by England on frivolous pretences. And many unfriendly cavils
were raised against the states with regard to Surinam and the conduct
of the East India Company.[**] [3] But about April, 1669 the strongest
symptoms appeared of those fatal measure which were afterwards more
openly pursued.
* D'Estrades, July 21, 1667.
** See note C, at the end of the volume.
De Wit at that time came to Temple, and told him, that he paid him a
visit as a friend, not as a minister. The occasion was, to acquaint him
with a conv
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