my attempting to hold the boot
of the peninsula. Now the British fleet had come, in force adequate to
neutralize the French Navy, and, in Nelson's belief, to defeat and
destroy it, if properly supported. Did Naples expect to escape by a
timid adherence to half measures, when by her notorious preference for
the British she had already gained the ill-will of the French? "The
French know as well as you and I do, that their Sicilian Majesties
called for our help to save them--even this is crime enough with the
French." Safety--true safety--could be had only by strenuous and
decisive action in support of Nelson's squadron. Did not the attack on
Malta indicate a design upon Sicily? "Were I commanding a fleet
attending an army which is to invade Sicily, I should say to the
general, 'If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of your fleet,
transports, stores, &c., and insures your safe retreat [from Sicily]
should that be necessary; for if even a superior fleet of the enemy
should arrive, before one week passes, they will be blown to leeward,
and you may pass with safety.' This would be my opinion.... I repeat
it, _Malta is the direct road to Sicily_." If the French are
overtaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can scarcely
be so strong but that I can get at them, but there will be needed
things which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when
one hour would either destroy or drive them out. Without such aid, the
British may be crippled in their attempt, and forced to leave the
Mediterranean. In case of blockade--or necessity to remain for any
reason--the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish.
Failing these it must retire, and then Sicily and Naples are lost.
Since, then, so much assistance must be given in time, why postpone
now, when one strong blow would give instant safety? Why should not
his own motto, "I will not lose a moment in attacking them," apply as
well to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral?

If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies of
the British arms than of the difficulties of a weak state of the
second order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations,
they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practice
of the writer, wherever he himself had to act. But Nelson could not
expect his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies. Even if the
course suggested were the best for Naples under t