French, there was nothing to do but to follow upon their track, with
eyes open for indications. They were known to have gone southerly,
towards Naples and Sicily; and these two points, parts of the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies, had been mentioned by Jervis as probable
destinations. The "Orion" and "Alexander" rejoined in two or three
days, and on the 14th of June information, second-hand but probable,
was obtained that on the 4th the French armament had been seen off the
west end of Sicily, steering to the eastward. "If they pass Sicily,"
said Nelson in his letter to Spencer written the next day, "I shall
believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria, and
getting troops to India--a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by no
means so difficult as might at first view be imagined." Troubridge was
now sent ahead in the "Mutine" to communicate with Sir William
Hamilton, the British minister at Naples, and with Acton, the prime
minister of that Kingdom. He took with him letters from the admiral,
who wished to know what co-operation he might hope from the Court of
Naples, in the matters of supplies, of frigates to act as lookouts,
and of pilots for Sicilian waters.

On the 17th the squadron hove-to ten miles off Naples, and Troubridge
rejoined. The Neapolitan Government sent assurances of good wishes,
and of hatred to the French; supplies would be given under the rose,
and Acton sent a written order to that effect, addressed to the
governors of ports in the name of the King. Naples being at peace with
France, assistance with ships could not be given, nor, to use the
words of Nelson, "the smallest information of what was, or was likely
to be, the future destination of the French armament. With this
comfortable account I pushed for the Faro of Messina." Troubridge
brought word, however, that the French fleet was off Malta, about to
attack it, which served to give direction for the squadron's next
move.

After leaving Naples Nelson wrote strong and clear letters to Sir
William Hamilton upon the existing conditions. Why should Naples stand
in shivering hesitation about taking a decided step in support of
Great Britain? She had looked and prayed for the arrival of the fleet,
as the one force competent to check the designs of the French. Sicily
could be approached only by water, and the distance of Naples from
Northern Italy rendered the control of the sea most advantageous, if
not absolutely essential, to a French ar