understanding, and by it I ought to stand
or fall."
The destination of the enemy had been rightly divined, following out a
course of reasoning outlined by Nelson a week before in his letter to
Spencer; but successful pursuit was baffled for the moment by the
wiliness of Bonaparte, who directed his vast armament to be steered
for the south shore of Candia, instead of straight for Alexandria.
Even this would scarcely have saved him, had Nelson's frigates been
with the fleet. Immediately after the council, the admiral with his
customary promptitude kept away for Egypt under all sail. "I am just
returned from on board the Admiral," writes Saumarez, "and we are
crowding sail for Alexandria; but the contrast to what we experienced
yesterday is great indeed, having made sure of attacking them this
morning. At present it is very doubtful whether we shall fall in with
them at all, as we are proceeding upon the merest conjecture only, and
not on any positive information. Some days must now elapse before we
can be relieved from our cruel suspense; and if, at the end of our
journey, we find we are upon a wrong scent, our embarrassment will be
great indeed. Fortunately, I only act here _en second_; but did the
chief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my too
irritable nerves would bear." Such was the contemporary estimate of an
eye-witness, an officer of tried and singular gallantry and ability,
who shared the admiral's perplexities and ambitions, though not his
responsibility. His words portray justly the immensity of the burden
Nelson bore. That, indeed, is the inevitable penalty of command; but
it must be conceded that, when adequately borne, it should convey also
an equal measure of renown.
In the morning, before the consultation with the captains, three
French frigates had been seen; but Nelson, warned by the parting of
the "Orion" and "Alexander" a fortnight before, would not run the risk
of scattering the squadron by chasing them. No time could now be lost,
waiting for a separated ship to catch up. The circumstance of the
fleet being seen by these frigates was quoted in a letter from Louis
Bonaparte, who was with the expedition, to his brother Joseph, and was
made the ground for comment upon the stupidity of the British admiral,
who with this opportunity failed to find the armament. The criticism
is unjust; had the frigates taken to flight, as of course they would,
the British fleet, if not divided,
|