should permit her coast to be attacked by the English and French
navies, and her participation in the Triple Alliance always carried the
proviso that it did not bind her to fight England. This was well known
in the German foreign office, and, indeed, in France where the writers
upon war were reckoning confidently on the withdrawing of Italy from the
Triple Alliance, and planning to use the entire forces of France against
Germany.

A better understanding of the Italian position will result from a
consideration of the origin of the Triple Alliance.

After the war of 1870, Bismarck, perceiving the quick recovery of
France, considered the advisability of attacking her again, and, to use
his own words, "bleeding her white." He found, however, that if this
were attempted France would be joined by Russia and England and he gave
up this plan. In order, however, to render France powerless he planned
an alliance which should be able to control Europe. A league between
Germany, Austria and Russia was his desire, and for some time every
opportunity was taken to develop friendship with the Czar. Russia,
however, remained cool. Her Pan-Slavonic sympathies were opposed to the
interests of Germany. Bismarck, therefore, determined, without losing
the friendship of Russia, to persuade Italy to join in the continental
combination. Italy, at the time, was the least formidable of the six
great powers, but Bismarck foresaw that she could be made good use of
in such a combination.

At that time Italy, just after the completion of Italian unity, found
herself in great perplexity. Her treatment of the Pope had brought about
the hostility of Roman Catholics throughout the world. She feared both
France and Austria, who were strong Catholic countries, and hardly knew
where to look for friends. The great Italian leader at the time was
Francesco Crispi, who, beginning as a Radical and a conspirator, had
become a constitutional statesman. Bismarck professed the greatest
friendship for Crispi, and gave Crispi to understand that he approved of
Italy's aspirations on the Adriatic and in Tunis.

The next year, however, at the Berlin Congress, Italy's interests were
ignored, and finally, in 1882, France seized Tunis, to the great
indignation of the Italians. It has been shown in more recent times that
the French seizure of Tunis was directly due to Bismarck's instigation.

The Italians having been roused to wrath, Bismarck proceeded to offer
them a