d of all other issues, the great complaint of Europe against our
conduct of the war is our 'inefficient blockade.' If we are to attach
faith to those arch-factors of falsehood, the New Orleans newspaper
editors, a vessel leaves their port daily and securely for the Havana.
It was the same journals which some months since announced in each
succeeding issue that 'the fifteen millions loan is all taken;' 'the
loan is very nearly taken;' 'it gives us pleasure to announce that the
loan is now completed,' and so on, backing up their assertion's by a
series of truly amusing details of 'proof.'

That sundry vessels _have_ broken the blockade is as palpable as that it
was for some time most inefficiently conducted. Yet, at the same time,
let the enormous difficulties of the task be remembered, and our great
want of means at the beginning of the war, when, stripped by the
machinations of traitors for years, we had indeed to _begin_ from almost
nothing. The coast from Maryland to Mexico is a different affair from
that of France or England. The great Napoleon himself, with all his
efforts, could never keep his coast-line unbroken by smugglers. Had
foreign critics of our war made the slightest friendly or kindly
allowance, they would never have spoken as they do of our 'inefficient
blockade.' But the great majority of their comments have been neither
kindly nor friendly.

Meanwhile, the work goes bravely on. 'The Stone Fleet' will soon have
effectually stopped that 'rat-hole,' Charleston, and it is evident that,
unless distracted by foreign intervention, the whole coast will be well
walled in and guarded. It must, will, and shall be done in time. 'It is
more difficult to move a mountain than a marble.'

* * * * *

It would be interesting to trace the probable European results of a war
between America and England. Russia, threatened with a servile war,
would find in a war with England the most effectual means of settling
home difficulties. Louis NAPOLEON, it is said, tacitly encourages
England to get to war. How long would he remain her ally when an
opportunity would present itself of avenging Waterloo? Or if Hungary
and the Sclavonian provinces blazed up in insurrection, what price less
than the long-coveted Rhine, and perhaps Belgium, would Louis NAPOLEON
accept for his services in aiding Austria? Or would he not take it
without rendering such problematic service? Let England beware his
friendship