ersity; unless the princes
themselves--so unexpectedly exalted--possess such superior talents that
they can discover at once the means of preserving their good-fortune,
and afterward maintain it by having recourse to the same measures which
others had adopted before them.

To adduce instances of supreme power attained by good-fortune and
superior talent, I may refer to two examples which have happened in our
own time, viz., Francis Sforza and Caesar Borgia. The former, by lawful
means and by his great abilities, raised himself from a private station
to the dukedom of Milan, and maintained with but little difficulty
what had cost him so much trouble to acquire. Caesar Borgia, Duke of
Valentinois--commonly called the duke of Valentino--on the other hand,
attained a sovereignty by the good-fortune of his father, which he lost
soon after his father's decease; though he exerted his utmost endeavors,
and employed every means that skill or prudence could suggest, to retain
those states which he had acquired by the arms and good-fortune of
another. For, though a good foundation may not have been laid before a
man arrives at dominion, it may possibly be accomplished afterward by
a ruler of superior mind; yet this can only be effected with much
difficulty to the architect and danger to the edifice. If therefore we
examine the whole conduct of Borgia, we shall see how firm a foundation
he had laid for future greatness. This examination will not be
superfluous--for I know no better lesson for the instruction of a prince
than is afforded by the actions and example of the Duke--for, if the
measures he adopted did not succeed, it was not his fault, but rather
owing to the extreme perversity of fortune. Pope Alexander VI, wishing
to give his son a sovereignty in Italy, had not only present but future
difficulties to contend with. In the first place, he saw no means of
making him sovereign of any state independent of the Church; and, if he
should endeavor to dismember the ecclesiastical state, he knew that the
Duke of Milan and the Venetians would never consent to it, because Faenza
and Rimini were already under the protection of the latter; and the
armies of Italy, from whom he might expect material service, were in the
hands of those who had the most reason to apprehend the aggrandizement of
the papal power, such as the Orsini, the Colonni, and their partisans.

It was consequently necessary to dissolve these connections and to throw