e and Alexandria
railroad aforesaid, while the stream of Bull Run, pursuing a
South-easterly course, has a general direction almost parallel with
that of the Manassas Gap railroad.
We shall find that it is the diamond-shaped parallelogram, formed by the
obtuse angle junction of the two railroads on the South, and the
similarly obtuse-angled crossing of the stream of Bull Run by the
Warrenton Pike on the North, that is destined to become the historic
battle-field of the first "Bull Run," or "Manassas;" and it is in the
Northern obtuse-angle of this parallelogram that the main fighting is
done, upon a spot not much more than one mile square, three sides of the
same being bounded respectively by the Bull Run stream, the Warrenton
Pike, which crosses it on a stone bridge, and the Sudley Springs road,
which crosses the Pike, at right-angles to it, near a stone house.
On the 3rd of June, 1861, General McDowell, in command of the Department
of North-Eastern Virginia, with head-quarters at Arlington, near
Washington, receives from Colonel Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General
with Lieutenant-General Scott--who is in Chief command of all the Union
Forces, with Headquarters at Washington--a brief but pregnant
communication, the body of which runs thus: "General Scott desires you
to submit an estimate of the number and composition of a column to be
pushed toward Manassas Junction, and perhaps the Gap, say in four or
five days, to favor Patterson's attack on Harper's Ferry. The rumor is
that Arlington Heights will be attacked to-night."
In response to this request, General McDowell submits, on the day
following, an estimate that "the actual entire force at the head of the
column should, for the purpose of carrying the position at Manassas and
of occupying both the road to Culpepper, and the one to the Gap, be as
much as 12,000 Infantry, two batteries of regular Artillery, and from
six to eight companies of Cavalry, with an available reserve, ready to
move forward from Alexandria by rail, of 5,000 Infantry and one heavy
field battery, rifled if possible; these numbers to be increased or
diminished as events may indicate." This force of raw troops he
proposes to organize into field brigades under the command of "active
and experienced colonels" of the regular Army. And while giving this
estimate as to the number of troops necessary, he suggestively adds that
"in proportion to the numbers used will be the lives saved; and as we
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