n beyond the
Potomac."

And it is not without interest to note Beauregard's subsequent
indorsement on the back of these Special Orders, that: "The plan of
attack prescribed within would have been executed, with modifications
affecting First and Fifth Brigades, to meet the attack upon Blackburn's
Ford, but for the expected coming of General Johnston's command, which
was known to be en route to join me on [Thursday] the 18th of July."

The knowledge thus possessed on Thursday, the 18th, by Beauregard, that
Johnston's Army is on its way to join him, is of infinite advantage to
the former. On the other hand, the complete ignorance, at this time, of
McDowell on this point,--and the further fact that he has been lulled
into a feeling of security on the subject, by General Scott's emphatic
assurance to him that "if Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have
Patterson on his heels"--is a great disadvantage to the Union general.

Were McDowell now aware of the real Military situation, he would
unquestionably make an immediate attack, with the object of crushing
Beauregard before Johnston can effect a junction with him. It would
then be a mere matter of detail for the armies of McDowell, McClellan,
and Patterson, to bag Johnston, and bring the armed Rebellion to an
inglorious and speedy end. But Providence--through the plottings of
individuals within our own lines--wills it otherwise.

Long before this, Patterson has been informed by General Winfield Scott
of the proposed movement by McDowell upon Manassas,--and of its date.

On Saturday, July 13th, General Scott telegraphed to Patterson: "I
telegraphed to you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the Enemy
early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the Valley
of Winchester; but if he retreats in force toward Manassas, and it be
too hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keys Ferry,
Leesburg, etc."

On Wednesday, the 17th, Scott telegraphs to Patterson: "I have nothing
official from you since Sunday (14th), but am glad to learn, through
Philadelphia papers, that you have advanced. Do not let the Enemy amuse
and delay you with a small force in front whilst he re-enforces the
Junction with his main body. McDowell's first day's work has driven the
Enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. The Junction will probably be carried
by to-morrow."

On Thursday, the 18th, Patterson replies that to attack "the greatly
superior force at Winchester when the