ure. In strong and explicit language other courts have
disclaimed such pretensions. The Minnesota court in _State_ v.
_Corbett_, 57 _Minn._ 345, held that courts were not at liberty to
declare a statute unconstitutional because it is thought by them to be
unjust or oppressive, or to violate some natural, social, or political
right of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is
prohibited, or such rights protected, by the constitution. The
Pennsylvania court in _Com._ v. _Moir_, 199 _Pa. St._ 534, used this
language: "Much of the argument and nearly all the specific objections
advanced are to the wisdom and propriety and to the justice of the
statute and the motives supposed to have inspired its passage. With
these we have nothing to do. They are beyond our province and are
considerations to be adduced solely to the legislature." The court of
West Virginia in _Slack_ v. _Jacob_, 8 _W. Va._ 612, said: "That the
judges are convinced that a statute is contrary to natural right,
absolute justice, or sound morality does not authorize them to refuse
it effect." The court of Washington in _Fishing Co._ v. _George_, 28
_Wash._ 200, held that "a statute cannot be ignored by the courts
because leading in its application to absurd, incongruous, or
mischievous results." A few cases may also be cited showing how
relentlessly this disclaimer is applied. The court of New York in
_Kittinger_ v. _Buffalo Traction Co._, 160 _N. Y._ 377, held that the
courts had no power to inquire into the motives inducing legislation
and could not impute to the legislature any other than public motives.
The Pennsylvania court in _Sunbury R.R. Co._ v. _People_, 33 _Pa. St._
278, had urged upon it the argument that the statute in question had
been "passed in fraud of the rights of the people." The court held
that, if true, that fact would not authorize it to refuse it effect.
The Tennessee court in _Lynn_ v. _Polk_, 76 _Tenn. St._ 121, was asked
to declare a statute ineffective because its enactment was procured by
bribing members of the legislature. The court held it could not do so.
The Missouri court in _Slate_ v. _Clarke_, 54 _Mo._ 17, had before it
a statute authorizing the licensing of bawdy houses and was urged to
declare it unconstitutional because against public policy and
destructive of good morals. The court held it had no such power. The
Justices of the Maine Supreme Court in an opinion reported in 103
_Maine_ 508 stated the princ
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