ear the
complaints and face the witnesses against him, and adduce evidence and
argument in reply,--and who can on their part see the witnesses and
hear the arguments before deciding. That was the opinion of the
British Parliament in the few cases presented to them, and the state
legislatures in this country have generally entertained the same
opinion. It was also held by Parliament that the address for removal
should state the reasons therefor. In 1855 Governor Gardner of
Massachusetts declined to remove a judge of probate on address by the
legislature because no sufficient grounds were stated in the address.
He said that in every instance then on record full reasons for removal
had accompanied the address.

The constitutional provision for removal by address evidently was not
designed to lessen the impartiality and independence of the judge by
subjecting him to removal at the mere will of the executive and
legislature, but that he might be removed for corruption, neglect of
duty, incapacity, immorality, or other disgraceful conduct, after
notice, hearing, and deliberation. For the executive and legislature,
or even the majority of the people, to remove a judge because they do
not like his opinions as to what the constitution requires or forbids
them to do, would destroy the independence of the judges and thus
deprive the citizen of all security for his rights and liberties under
the constitution,--would be despotism.

The principal argument for lessening the independence of the judges
and making them more subservient to the inconstant majority seems to
be that otherwise the judges will misuse their power and impede the
operation of statutes they do not themselves approve of. The argument
has little or no foundation in fact. Perhaps among the hundreds, if
not thousands, of cases of holding a statute unconstitutional a few
may seem to have been so decided because the judges thought them
unwise and oppressive. Some expressions in judicial opinions have been
unfortunate in that respect, but the courts everywhere in this
country, now if not at first, disclaim any such power. The same Chief
Justice Marshall, who had so convincingly stated the duty of the
judiciary to refuse effect to unconstitutional statutes, later in
_McCulloch_ v. _Maryland_, 4 _Wheat._ 316, disclaimed for the courts
all pretensions to any power to inquire into the necessity of any
statute, or in any way to interfere with the discretion of the
legislat