aths to observe constitutional limitations.
But another and different proposition is urged upon us. It is not to
leave the legislature without check upon the tendency to disregard
constitutional limitations upon its power, but to subject the judicial
check itself to reversal by a majority of that part of the electorate
choosing to act on the matter. It is proposed that whenever a court of
last resort shall adjudge that a statute trespasses upon the reserved
constitutional rights of the individual, an appeal may be taken direct
to the electorate, and that if a majority of those choosing to vote on
the question desire the statute to stand, the constitution shall
thereafter be held to be amended to that extent. It is submitted that
such a procedure would destroy all constitutional guaranties, no
matter what safeguards are attempted. Is there any assurance that such
a majority would be more considerate of the individual's right to
life, liberty, and property than their representatives whom they have
selected or should have selected for their virtue and wisdom, and who
are sworn, as well as the judges, to respect constitutional
guaranties?
Under the present procedure for amendment to constitutions,
propositions for amendment are first considered and debated face to
face in a legislature or constitutional convention by representatives
of the people, and cannot be submitted to the people until after
opportunity for full and free discussion by their representatives, and
the people themselves have thereby been more or less prepared for its
consideration. Even under this procedure, amendments have been adopted
that the people have afterward regretted. There is now much agitation
for the "short ballot," for restoring to the chief executive the power
of appointment of important officials, a power at first possessed by
him, but taken away by later constitutional amendments. The adoption
of the "initiative and referendum" has not produced the beneficial
results expected. It is found that the initiative sometimes produces
defective, unworkable statutes, and that the referendum can be used to
delay and even veto expedient legislation.
Under the proposed procedure the questions whether the constitution
should be amended and as to the nature of the amendment are sprung
upon the people without this preliminary examination, debate and
approval by their chosen representatives, and this often, if not
always, in times of popular excitem
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