the night (which,
according to the author of _The Mirror_, is after sunset and before
sunrising)."--_Impey on Distress and Replevin_, p. 49.

In common law, the day is now supposed among lawyers to be from six in the
morning to seven at night for service of notices; in Chancery till eight at
night. And a service after such times at night {372} would be counted as
good only for the next day. In the case of Liffin _v._ Pitcher, 1 _Dowl.
N. S._ 767., Justice Coleridge said, "I am in the habit of giving
twenty-four hours to plead when I give one day." Thus it will be perceived
that a lawyer's day is of different lengths.

With regard to the time at which a person arrives at majority, we have good
authority in support of PROFESSOR DE MORGAN'S statement:

"So that full age in male or female is twenty-one years, which age is
completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person's birth, who
till that time is an infant, and so styled in law."--Blackstone's
_Commentaries_, vol. i. p. 463.

There is no doubt also that the law rejects fractions of a day where it is
possible:

"It is clear that the law rejecteth all fractions of days for the
uncertainty, and commonly allows him that hath part of the day in law
to have the whole day, unless where it, by fraction or relation, may be
a prejudice to a third person."--Sir O. Bridgm. l.

And in respect to the present case it is quite clear. In the case of Reg.
_v._ The Parish of St. Mary, Warwick, reported in the _Jurist_ (vol. xvii.
p. 551.), Lord Campbell said:

"In some cases the Court does not regard the fraction of a day. Where
the question is on what day a person came of age, the fraction of the
day on which he was born and on which he came of age is not
considered."

And farther on he says:

"It is a general maxim that the law does not regard the fraction of a
day."

RUSSELL GOLE.

I only treat misquotation as an _offence_ in the old sense of the word; and
courteously, but most positively, I deny the right of any one who quotes to
omit, or to alter emphasis, without stating what he has done. That A. E. B.
did misunderstand me, I was justified in inferring from his implication (p.
198. col. 2) that I made the day begin "a minute after midnight."

Arthur Hopton, whom A. E. B. quotes against me (but the quotation is from
chapter xiv., not xiii.), is wrong in his law. The lawyers, from Coke down
to our