, the firing line
and support companies were warned that they might be required to
advance.

Punctually at 2.31 a.m. on 16th August, we opened fire along our whole
front. The intensity and volume of the enemy's reply were startling.
Within a minute rifles and machine-guns were showering a hail of lead on
our parapets. It almost looked as if they had been expecting an attack
to develop from our sector. At any rate they had been very much on the
alert and their trenches were strongly held. This strength they
disclosed to an extent which at once proved the futility of any attempt
on our part to rush F12. It was not a case of a sudden burst of fire
dying away rapidly. The General had instructed the C.O. to report to him
by telephone at 2.50. At that hour there was not the slightest
diminution apparent in the spray of bullets which was lashing our front.
At least one machine-gun was pelting, at very close range, the barricade
blocking the northern end of the stretch of F12 held by us--the very
barricade behind which one of our patrols was waiting to slip out into
the open. Others were ripping up our sandbags here and there along the
line. No patrol could possibly venture out into such a storm. This was
reported to the General, who asked the C.O. to ring him up again when
things became quieter.

Within about twenty minutes the machine-guns dropped out. The enemy had
apparently come to the conclusion that any attack we might have been
meditating had been nipped in the bud. Their rifle fire also slackened
perceptibly, although it continued until daybreak much heavier than
their usual night firing. On comparing notes, we found that two, if not
three, machine-guns, had disclosed themselves in the dilapidated length
of F12 between our barricade and the "shell-holed" tree--a portion of
the trench which we had hitherto regarded as entirely abandoned--and
that there were more of them in the same trench between the tree and
the small nullah; the exact positions could not however be located.
Several had also been spotted in F13 and from the direction of F12A. The
trap had been baited for us, and it was well that we had not walked into
it.

At 3 a.m. the C.O. again reported to the General, who was much
interested to hear of the nest of machine-guns we had discovered. He
asked for a written report and sketch showing approximately their
positions. He also informed me that the attack on the Vineyard had not
been successful. Lieut. Leit