on attacks would be made from the flanks. To enable this to
be carried out the Engineers had tunnelled a way through the cliff
rising from West Krithia nullah to a point which they calculated was
directly opposite the western end of G11A. They did not carry the tunnel
right through at this time but left an outer shell which could be
knocked away when the attack was to take place. It was a great piece of
engineering work and in some ways proved very useful when the attack was
ultimately carried out, although in others it probably accounted for a
number of the casualties which the battalion suffered. To enable the
Colonel to submit his report and make the necessary preparations,
officers frequently visited the line and reconnoitred the position.
Major Neilson and Lieut. Leith made a reconnaissance of G11A by night,
entering the trench through a man-hole near the mouth of the tunnel.
They gained the necessary information and the C.O.'s report was
submitted to Brigade Headquarters, who approved of the scheme and orders
were issued that the attack should be carried out on Sunday the 19th
December.

It is a peculiar thing that during the Gallipoli campaign, and in fact
throughout most of the war, that the attacks in which the Battalion took
part were carried out on a Sunday, which we were accustomed to regard as
a day of rest. Whether this was done with the object of deceiving the
Turk is uncertain.

The final orders issued by Battalion Headquarters were on the following
lines. The Battalion was to seize and hold the following enemy trenches.

(_a_) The north-west portion of G11A from West Krithia nullah inclusive
to junction inclusive of G11A, with the main central communication
trench leading north-east from G11A to G12C. If the remaining portion of
G11A was found to be either unoccupied or very lightly occupied that
portion was also to be seized and held.

(_b_) The portion of G12 lying between the East Krithia nullah and the
junction of G12 with the enemy communication trench leading south from
G12 to Grenade Station No. 2.

(_c_) That portion of the communication trench referred to in (_b_) as
leading south from junction with G12 to Grenade Station No. 2.

The above trenches were to be consolidated at once and barricades for
Grenade Stations erected at about points A, B, C, D, E, F and G, as
shown in corresponding red letters on the sketch. In the case of E, F
and G, communication was to be at once opened to our Gr