xistere,_ or _existere_ apart from _esse,_
good is nothing apart from truth or truth from good. What, again, is good
which has no relation to anything? Can it be called good if it is without
affection and perception?

[2] That which is associated with good, permitting it to affect and to be
perceived and felt, is referable to truth, since it has relation to what
is in the understanding. Tell someone, not that a given thing is good,
but simply say "good"--is good anything? It becomes something from what is
perceived along with it. This is united with good only in the
understanding, and all understanding has relation to truth. It is the
same with willing. Apart from knowing, perceiving and thinking what one
wills, to will is nothing actual; together with them it becomes
something. All volition is of love and is referable to good; and all
knowing, perceiving and thinking is of the understanding, and is
referable to truth. It is clear, then, that to will is nothing actual,
but to will this or that means something.

[3] So also with a use, inasmuch as a use is a good. Unless a use is
addressed to something which makes one with it, it is not a use, and thus
not anything. A use derives its something from the understanding, and
what is thence conjoined or adjoined to it, has relation to truth. So a
use gets its character.

[4] From these few things it is plain that good is nothing apart from
truth, nor truth anything apart from good. But if good together with
truth and truth together with good are something, evil with falsity and
falsity with evil are not, for the latter are opposite to the former and
the opposition destroys--that is, destroys the something. But of this in
what follows.

12. Marriage of good and truth may, however, be found either in a cause
or from the cause in an effect. In a cause the marriage of good and truth
is one of will and understanding, or of love and wisdom. Such a marriage
is in all that a man wills and thinks and in all his ensuing
determinations and purposes. This marriage enters into and in fact
produces the effect. But in producing the effect, good and truth seem
distinct, for then the simultaneous turns successive. When, for example,
a man wills and thinks about food, clothing, shelter, business or
employment, or about his relationship to others, first he wills and
thinks or comes to his conclusions and intentions all at the same time;
but when these are determined to effects, truth follow