or Territory, or to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and
regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way subject only
to the Constitution of the United States." I have called his attention
to the fact that when he and some others began arguing that they were
giving an increased degree of liberty to the people in the Territories
over and above what they formerly had on the question of slavery, a
question was raised whether the law was enacted to give such
unconditional liberty to the people; and to test the sincerity of this
mode of argument, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amendment, in which
he made the law--if the amendment were adopted--expressly declare that
the people of the Territory should have the power to exclude slavery if
they saw fit. I have asked attention also to the fact that Judge
Douglas, and those who acted with him, voted that amendment down,
notwithstanding it expressed exactly the thing they said was the true
intent and meaning of the law. I have called attention to the fact
that in subsequent times a decision of the Supreme Court has been made
in which it has been declared that a Territorial Legislature has no
constitutional right to exclude slavery. And I have argued and said
that for men who did intend that the people of the Territory should
have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and unconditionally, the
voting down of Chase's amendment is wholly inexplicable. It is a
puzzle--a riddle. But I have said that with men who did look forward
to such a decision, or who had it in contemplation, that such a
decision of the Supreme Court would or might be made, the voting down
of that amendment would be perfectly rational and intelligible. It
would keep Congress from coming in collision with the decision when it
was made. Anybody can conceive that if there was an intention or
expectation that such a decision was to follow, it would not be a very
desirable party attitude to get into for the Supreme Court--all or
nearly all its members belonging to the same party--to decide one way,
when the party in Congress had decided the other way. Hence it would
be very rational for men expecting such a decision to keep the niche in
that law clear for it. After pointing this out, I tell Judge Douglas
that it looks to me as though here was the reason why Chase's amendment
was voted down. I tell him that as he did it, and knows why he did it,
if it wa