stem; as the expression of an active spiritual principle
there must be reason and purpose in it. But reason is not identified
by Schelling with self-conscious intelligence, for with the
faith-philosophies and Romanticism he takes it in a wider sense; in
physical and organic nature it is a slumbering reason, an unconscious,
instinctive, purposive force similar to the Leibnizian monad,
Schopenhauer's will, and Bergson's _elan vital_. In this way the
dualism between mechanism and teleology is reconciled. Nature is
a teleological order, an evolution from the unconscious to the
conscious; in man, the highest stage and the climax of history, nature
becomes self-conscious. With this organic conception both Romanticists
and many natural scientists of the age were in practical agreement;
it was the view that had always appealed to Goethe--and Herder before
him--and it gained for Schelling a large following. In his earlier
system he regarded nature as a lower stage in the evolution of
reason and sought to answer the problems: How does Nature become
Consciousness or Ego? the problem of the Philosophy of Nature; and,
How does Consciousness or the Ego become Nature? the problem of
Transcendental Idealism. In his philosophy of identity, nature and
mind are conceived as two different aspects of one and the same
principle, which is both mind and nature, subject and object, ego and
non-ego. All things are identical in essence but differentiated in the
course of evolution. It was not inconsistent with these tenets that
Schelling sought, in his last period, to discover the meaning
of universal history in the obscure beginnings of mythology
and revelation rather than in the lucid regions of an advanced
civilization.

With the opponents of rationalism Schelling agrees that we cannot
reach the inner meaning of reality, "the living, moving element
in nature," through the scientific intelligence, but that we must
envisage it in intuition. "What is described in concepts," he tells
us, "is at rest; hence there can be concepts only of _things_ and of
that which is finite and sense-perceived. The notion of movement is
not movement itself, and without intuition we should never know what
motion is. Freedom, however, can be comprehended only by freedom,
activity only by activity." Schelling, who is a poet as well as a
philosopher, comes to regard this intuition or inner vision as an
artistic intuition. In the products of art, subject and object, the