ome central body,
capable of controlling and directing the whole force of the nation; and
after a supreme junta was at last established in Madrid, its orders were
continually disputed and disobeyed--so that in effect there was no
national government. Equally disgraceful jealousies among the generals
prevented the armies from being placed under one supreme chief,
responsible for the combination of all their movements. In place of this
it was with difficulty that the various independent generals could be
prevailed on even to meet at Madrid, and agree to the outline of a joint
campaign; and that outline seemed to have no recommendation except that
its gross military defects held out to each member of the Council the
prospect of being able to act without communication, for good or for
evil, with any of the others. The consequences of these shameful follies
were calamitous: and but for events which could not have been foreseen,
must have proved fatal: for the gigantic resources of the common enemy
were about to be set in motion by Napoleon himself; who, on hearing of
the reverses of Dupont, Lefebre, and Junot, perceived too clearly that
the affairs of the Peninsula demanded a keener eye and a firmer hand
than his brother's.

[Footnote 59: Col. Napier, chap. i.]

CHAPTER XXV

Napoleon at Erfurt--At Paris--Arrives at Vittoria--Disposition of
the French and Spanish Armies--Successes of Soult--Passage of the
Somosierra--Surrender of Madrid--Sir John Moore's Campaign--his
Retreat--Battle of Coruna--Death of Moore--Napoleon leaves Spain.

Three Spanish armies, each unfortunately under an independent chief,
were at length in motion: their nominal strength was 130,000 men; in
reality they never exceeded 100,000. Had they been combined under an
able general, they might have assaulted the French army, now not
exceeding 60,000, with every likelihood of success; for the position
first taken up by King Joseph, after his retreat into the north, was
very defective; but the Spaniards chose their basis of operations so
absurdly, and were so dilatory afterwards, that Napoleon had time both
to rectify Joseph's blunders and to reinforce his legions effectually,
before they were able to achieve any considerable advantage.

Blake, who commanded on the west, extended his line from Burgos to
Bilboa; Palafox, on the east, lay between Zaragossa and Sanguessa;
Castanos, general of the central army, had his headquarters