forces on his right,
the population of Vienna and the surrounding territories ready to rise,
in case of any disaster, in his rear; and Prussia as decidedly hostile
in heart as she was wavering in policy. The French leader did not
disguise from himself the risk of his adventure; but he considered it
better to run all that risk, than to linger in Vienna until the armies
in Hungary and Bohemia should have had time to reinforce the two
emperors.

Napoleon's preparations were as follows:--his left, under Larmes, lay
at Santon, a strongly fortified position: Soult commanded the right
wing: the centre, under Bernadotte, had with them Murat and all the
cavalry. Behind the line lay the reserve, consisting of 20,000, 10,000
of whom were of the Imperial guard, under Oudinot: and here Napoleon
himself took his station. But besides these open demonstrations,
Davoust, with a division of horse and another of foot, lay behind the
convent of Raygern, considerably in the rear of the French right--being
there placed by the Emperor, in consequence of a false movement, into
which he, with a seer-like sagacity, foresaw the enemy might, in all
likelihood, he tempted; and to which he lured them on accordingly by
every engine of his craft.

Buonaparte, on learning that the Emperor Alexander was personally in the
hostile camp, sent Savary to present his compliments to that sovereign;
but really, as we may suppose, to observe as much as he could of the
numbers and condition of the troops. Savary, on his return, informed his
master that the Russian prince was surrounded by a set of young
coxcombs, whose every look and gesture expressed overweening confidence
in themselves and contempt for their opponents. All the reverses of the
previous campaign were, as they took care to signify, the result of
unpardonable cowardice among the Austrians, whose spirit had been quite
broken by the wars in Italy: but they were the countrymen of the same
Suwarrow who had beaten the French out of all Buonaparte's Lombard
conquests, and the first general battle would show what sort of enemies
the Russians were. How much of this statement is true we know not: it
was openly made at the time in one of Buonaparte's bulletins--and, what
is of more moment, he appears to have acted on the belief that Savary
told the truth. Having, ere he received it, advanced several leagues
beyond the chosen field of battle, near Austerlitz, he forthwith
retreated on that position, with a