than that which rewards; like
the cathedral chapter, the ecclesiastical tribunal has lost its
consistency and independence, its efficiency; nothing remains of the
ancient bishop's court but an appearance and a name.[5235]

At one time, the bishop in person is himself the whole court; he
deliberates only with himself and decides ex informata conscientia
without a trial, without advice, and, if he chooses, in his own cabinet
with closed doors, in private according to facts, the value of which
he alone estimates, and through motives of which he is the sole
appreciator. At another time, the presiding magistrate is one of
his grand-vicars, his revocable delegate, his confidential man, his
megaphone, in short, another self, and this official acts without the
restraint of ancient regulations, of a fixed and understood procedure
beforehand, of a series of judicial formalities, of verifications and
the presence of witnesses, of the delays and all other legal precautions
which guard the judge against prejudice, haste, error, and ignorance and
without which justice always risks becoming injustice. In both cases,
the head over which the sentence is suspended lacks guarantees, and,
once pronounced, this sentence is definitive. For, on appeal to the
court of the metropolitan bishop, it is always confirmed;[5236] the
bishops support each other, and, let the appellant be right or wrong,
the appeal is in itself a bad mark against him: he did not submit at
once, he stood out against reproof, he was lacking in humility, he has
set an example of insubordination, and this alone is a grave fault.
There remains the recourse to Rome; but Rome is far off,[5237] and,
while maintaining her superior jurisdiction, she does not willingly
cancel an episcopal verdict; she treats prelates with respect, she is
careful of her lieutenant-generals, her collectors of Saint Peter's
pence. As to the lay tribunals, these have declared themselves
incompetent,[5238] and the new canon law teaches that never, "under the
pretext of a writ of error, may a priest make an appeal to the secular
magistrate";[5239] through this appeal, "he derogates from the authority
and liberty of the Church and is liable to the gravest censures;" he
betrays his order.

Such is now, for the lower clergy, ecclesiastical law, and likewise
secular law, both agreeing together in not affording him protection;
add to this change in the jurisprudence which concerns him a no less
divisive c