enemy. Your lordship deprived yourself of frigates, to make mine,
certainly, the first squadron in the world; and I feel that I have zeal
and activity to do credit to your appointment: and yet, to be
unsuccessful, hurts me most sensibly. But, if they are above water, I
will find them out; and, if possible, bring them to battle. You have
done your part, in giving me so fine a fleet; and I hope to do mine, in
making use of them. It is my intention to get into the mouth of the
Archipelago; where, if the enemy are gone towards Constantinople, we
shall hear of them directly: if I get no information there, to go to
Cyprus; where, if they are in Syria or Egypt, I must hear of them. We
have a report that, on the 1st of July, the French were seen off Candia;
but, near what part of the island I cannot learn."

Being now ready for sea, and finding that the French fleet had neither
been seen in the Archipelago, nor the Adriatic, nor gone down the
Mediterranean, he concluded that the coast of Egypt must still be the
object of their destination. With this impression on his anxious mind,
it is not to be supposed that he would for a moment hesitate in again
seeking them there, through any consideration of the immoderate heat of
climate, or other experienced or apprehended hardships.

On the 25th of July, accordingly, the British squadron sailed from
Syracuse; and, hoping some positive information might be obtained in the
Morea, he steered first for that coast: having, on the 28th, made the
Gulph of Coron, Captain Troubridge was dispatched with the Culloden,
into the port of Coron; off which place, owing to the usual active
exertion of that able officer, the fleet was not detained longer than
three hours. The Turkish governor, with great pleasure, gave Captain
Troubridge the welcome intelligence, that the enemy had been seen
steering to the south-east, from Candia, about four weeks before. The
captain had, also, during his very short visit, the satisfaction of
observing that the inhabitants of Coron entertained the most serious
apprehensions from the French armament, and expressed the greatest
possible detestation and abhorrence of that people.

The reasons now became evident, which had before seemed unaccountable,
how it happened that the enemy should have been missed by the British
squadron, both in it's passage to Alexandria, and in it's return to
Syracuse. The French, having steered a direct course for Candia, had
necessarily made