ects of
certain lines of conduct on the character of the individual and on the
general good are perceived; and then the self-regarding virtues come
within the scope of public opinion and receive praise and their
opposites blame. But with the less civilized nations reason often errs,
and many bad customs and base superstitions come within the same scope
and are then esteemed as high virtues and their breach as heavy crimes.

The moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed as of higher value
than the intellectual powers. But we should bear in mind that the
activity of the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of the
fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. This affords the
strongest argument for educating and stimulating in all possible ways
the intellectual faculties of every human being. No doubt, a man with a
torpid mind, if his social affections and sympathies are well developed,
will be led to good actions and may have a fairly sensitive conscience.
But whatever renders the imagination more vivid and strengthens the
habit of recalling and comparing past impressions will make the
conscience more sensitive, and may even somewhat compensate for weak
social affections and sympathies.

The moral nature of man has reached its present standard partly through
the advancement of his reasoning powers and consequently of a just
public opinion, but especially from his sympathies having been rendered
more tender and widely diffused through the effects of habit, example,
instruction and reflection. It is not improbable that after long
practice virtuous tendencies may be inherited. With the more civilized
races the conviction of the existence of an all-seeing Deity has had a
potent influence on the advance of morality. Ultimately man does not
accept the praise or blame of his fellows as his sole guide, though few
escape this influence, but his habitual convictions, controlled by
reason, afford him the safest rule. His conscience then becomes the
supreme judge and monitor. Nevertheless, the first foundation or origin
of the moral sense lies in the social instincts, including sympathy; and
these instincts, no doubt, were primarily gained, as in the case of the
lower animals, through natural selection.

The belief in God has often been advanced as not only the greatest but
the most complete of all the distinctions between man and the lower
animals. It is, however, impossible, as we have seen, to maintain t