the
lower animals. But in the fourth chapter I have endeavoured to show that
the moral sense follows, firstly, from the enduring and ever-present
nature of the social instincts; secondly, from man's appreciation of the
approbation and disapprobation of his fellows; and, thirdly, from the
high activity of his mental faculties, with past impressions extremely
vivid; and in these latter respects he differs from the lower animals.
Owing to this condition of mind, man cannot avoid looking both backward
and forward and comparing past impressions. Hence, after some temporary
desire or passion has mastered his social instincts, he reflects and
compares the now weakened impression of such past impulses with the
ever-present social instincts; and he then feels that sense of
dissatisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind them, he
therefore resolves to act differently for the future--and this is
conscience. Any instinct permanently stronger or more enduring than
another gives rise to a feeling which we express by saying that it ought
to be obeyed. A pointer dog if able to reflect on his past conduct would
say to himself, I ought (as indeed we say of him) to have pointed at
that hare and not have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it.

Social animals are impelled partly by a wish to aid the members of their
community in a general manner, but more commonly to perform certain
definite actions. Man is impelled by the same general wish to aid his
fellows; but has few or no special instincts. He differs also from the
lower animals in the power of expressing his desires by words, which
thus become a guide to the aid required and bestowed. The motive to give
aid is likewise much modified in man; it no longer consists solely of a
blind instinctive impulse, but is much influenced by the praise or blame
of his fellows. The appreciation and bestowal of praise and blame both
rest on sympathy; and this emotion, as we have seen, is one of the most
important elements of the social instincts. Sympathy, though gained as
an instinct, is also much strengthened by exercise or habit. As all men
desire their own happiness, praise or blame is bestowed on actions or
motives according as they lead to this end; and as happiness is an
essential part of the general good the greatest-happiness principle
indirectly serves as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong. As the
reasoning powers advance and experience is gained the remoter eff