icted."

The United States had spoken: "Withdraw your new submarine decree
before making any proposal," it had demanded of Berlin. Germany had
spoken: "Our course cannot be changed."

The situation in Washington drifted along without any definite program
of future action being disclosed; but the President was not idle. He
decided--though he held the power himself--to ask Congress for
authority to protect American shipping on the high seas by providing
merchantmen with naval guns and gunners. There was a freight
congestion in Atlantic ports, due to the reluctance of American
shipowners to sail their vessels without defensive armament. The
President's decision was a step nearer war, for armed American
vessels, on encountering German submarines, would be bound to cause
hostilities, and war would be a reality. Berlin took this view. If the
United States armed its merchant ships, German opinion was that the
considerate submarines would be unable to save passengers and crews of
the vessels they sank. Were the vessels unarmed the submarines could
perform this kindly service. This sardonic hint was construed as an
official warning from Germany that the arming of American vessels
meant war. The Administration, however, was no longer concerned with
Germany's viewpoint. It realized that so long as it permitted American
ships to be held in port in fear of attack by submarines if they
ventured out, its inaction would in effect be viewed as acquiescing in
the German policy. Such a state of affairs, it was decided, could not
be allowed to continue indefinitely.

CHAPTER LXII

BERLIN'S TACTICS

Before the armed neutrality stage of the prewar period was reached
certain events transpired in Berlin which call for inclusion in the
record.

Immediately upon the rupture of diplomatic relations the State
Department notified Ambassador Gerard, who was requested to ask for
his passports. About the same time the German Government acceded to a
demand made by Secretary Lansing for the release of a number of
Americans captured from ships sunk by a German raider in the South
Atlantic and taken to a German port on board one of them, the British
steamer _Yarrowdale_. Germany had no right to hold these men as
prisoners at all, since they were neutrals. Yet there was an attempt
to interject their release into the international crisis as an olive
branch and a concession to American feeling. The two issues were
distinct; but Germany, by h