ng of bargains, since neither was a
competitor of the other, and hence could have no radical difference of
view on questions to the settlement of which they had been drawn in
union against a common foe. The attitude of the British mission
invited American cooperation, reciprocal service, and expressed
gratitude for the American partnership. They had no policies to
suggest to the Administration. They had much information on the
conduct of the war to lay before the United States--specially
blunders to be avoided; but they did not presume to teach Americans
how to make war. The United States, on its part, eagerly wanted to
know all that could be known, and to be guided accordingly.

A week of conferences clarified the situation. Both the British and
French missions revealed with surprising frankness the status of the
Allied resources and the military situation. Great Britain was
especially candid in disclosing the extent of her losses by
submarines. She needed ships, as many as America could build. France
needed an American army at once to augment her man power. Italy wanted
coal and grain. Most of all, the collapse of Russia's military
organization had brought the Allies to the pass of relying on American
aid as imperative if Germany was to be defeated.

The personal contact between American Government officials and the
various missions, especially the British, produced a mutual confidence
and sympathy not to be measured by words. Resources and needs were
frankly stated. The United States disclosed what it could do and how.
The way, in short, was cleared for the United States to enter the
Grand Alliance on a basis making for efficient cooperation in the
conduct of the war.

A gentleman's agreement was effected with neither side committed to
any binding policy. The United States retained a free hand, and was
not controlled, formally or informally, by any entangling undertaking
as to any future course it might elect to take in its relations with
Germany. But one enlightening point emerged. It was that while the
United States was free to enter into any peace it chose, it would not
enter into a separate peace. No action in that direction was
imaginable in the circumstances without consulting the Entente Allies.
This injection of peace considerations into the war situation, before
the United States had really entered the lists with troops and guns,
was taking time by the forelock. But it was needful to clear the air
early,