correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws
of the Union over those of the States, or to show that implication, as
is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred! The
Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of our
union, our defense in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It
shall descend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical
construction, to our posterity; and the sacrifices of local interest, of
State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it
into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its support.

The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws are,
that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are
required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed. The
Constitution has given expressly to Congress the right of raising
revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.
The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than
that which results from the power of changing the representatives who
abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may undoubtedly abuse this
discretionary power, but the same may be said of others with which they
are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution
has given it to the representatives of all the people, checked by the
representatives of the States, and by the executive power. The South
Carolina construction gives it to the legislature, or the convention of
a single State, where neither the people of the different States, nor
the States in their separate capacity, nor the chief magistrate elected
by the people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet
disposition of the power? I do not ask you, fellow-citizens, which is
the constitutional disposition--that instrument speaks a language not to
be misunderstood. But if you were assembled in general convention, which
would you think the safest depository of this discretionary power in the
last resort? Would you add a clause giving it to each of the States, or
would you sanction the wise provisions already made by your
Constitution? If this should be the result of your deliberations when
providing for the future, are you--can you--- be ready to risk all that
we hold dear, to establish, for a temporary and a local purpose, that
which you must acknowledge to be destructive, and even absurd, as a
general provision? Carry out the consequenc