ve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of
an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated
to destroy it.

I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States,
assumed by one State, _incompatible with the existence of the Union,
contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized
by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was
founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed_.

After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the
particular application of it which is made in the ordinance.

The preamble rests its justification on these grounds: It assumes as a
fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for
raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of
manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional; that the
operation of these laws is unequal; that the amount raised by them is
greater than is required by the wants of the government; and, finally,
that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the
Constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open
opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the
Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first actually
acknowledges that the law in question was passed under power expressly
given by the Constitution, to lay and collect imposts; but its
constitutionality is drawn in question from the motives of those who
passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case,
nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an
unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law
enacted under a constitutional power, shall make that law void; for how
is that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How
often may bad purposes be falsely imputed? In how many cases are they
concealed by false professions? In how many is no declaration of motive
made? Admit this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled
right to decide, and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If,
therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a
State may annul an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it
will not apply to the present case.

The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This
objection may be made with truth to every law that has been or c