things is found to be such,
that success is not improbable, and the benefits of it great and
permanent, while the disadvantages of a failure, comparatively
speaking, are small, and of a transient nature, in such a case it
should seem that the measure should be hazarded. Though I do not
believe this to be the very moment, in which her Imperial Majesty
would wish to form any political connexion with the United States, but
on the contrary, she would wish to postpone it till the conclusion of
the war, and be well pleased that no advances should be made on our
part till then; because this would afford her opportunity to claim
much merit of the Court of London, in having withheld any
encouragement to us, when at the same time not only any offence to the
United States would be avoided, but she might allege, without a
possibility of contradiction, that if an earlier application had been
made by them, she would have been happy to have had an occasion to
manifest her respect for them, and the early interests she took in
their concerns.

Nevertheless there is room to suppose, that if our propositions were
communicated while the British King is in fact treating with the
United States, as with an independent Sovereign power, that they would
not be rejected. And if they were received, this circumstance might be
productive of great benefit to our permanent interests. It would, in
all probability, bring on a declaration of our independence by some
other very considerable powers of Europe, particularly Sweden and
Russia. The neutral maritime powers would extend the protection of
their commerce and navigation to America, and no longer suffer their
flags to be insulted on our coasts. The Court of London would treat of
peace with more zeal and good faith. They would the more readily give
up certain claims and pretensions, which they will doubtless make upon
the United States, and would be exceedingly cautious how they broke
off any negotiations, which they had opened. In a word, we should
stand on a more advantageous and independent ground of treaty.

For the attainment of objects like these, had any discretionary power
been left me, I should have thought it clearly my duty to have made
the attempt here in this moment, as I now consider it to be my duty to
wait for the conclusion of the war, the period which is pointed out
to me as the only proper one, and when most certainly nothing will
remain to be hazarded.

If the present negotia