ere was nothing before him which
rendered it necessary for him to do so. He added that he would adhere to
the practice which had uniformly prevailed, and that he would not
hesitate to proceed with the ordinary business of the Court, adjourning
it from day to day as occasion required. Judge Willis, still standing,
then said: "You cannot adjourn a Court that does not exist. The Court is
not legally constituted. Its functions cannot be exercised, and any
proceedings you may take will be void." "I am aware," replied Mr.
Sherwood, "that such is your opinion; but I have a right to mine and I
shall pursue the course I have indicated. If that course,
notwithstanding the practice which has hitherto prevailed, should prove
to be wrong, I shall extremely regret it; but I feel it to be a matter
of too much importance to the business of the country to take upon
myself to vary from it, without the interference of a higher authority."
Judge Willis then briefly repeated his protest, and retired from the
bench. His colleague, after transacting some unimportant routine
business, adjourned the Court until the following day. Throughout the
rest of the Term he was the sole occupant of the Bench.

Judge Willis's conduct on this occasion does not admit of much diversity
of opinion. For one thing, as was subsequently decided by the Privy
Council, he was wrong in his view of the law. This is of itself an
important consideration. But even if his view had been a sound one,
admitting of no doubt, he incurred a very serious responsibility in
giving currency to it at such a time, and in such a manner. His conduct
was certain to produce great excitement and disturbance in the public
mind. It was certain to create an increased distrust of long-settled
institutions, which it was highly essential for the well-being of
society that the public should regard with confidence and respect.
Besides, the rendering of the past and present proceedings of the Court
liable to doubt and uncertainty could not fail to seriously affect the
business interests of the country. If the practice of the Court had been
wrong, and if many of its proceedings were invalid, the wisest course
would have been to quietly take steps to bring about remedial
legislation, whereby all defects might have been cured, without the
serious risk of reviving old animosities and long-settled disputes. But
such a course as Judge Willis saw fit to adopt was wholly uncalled for,
no plea to the juris