fendant with nearly as great
vehemence as did the Crown prosecutor, stigmatizing him as "a wholesale
retailer of calumny." He pronounced the _Freeman's_ report to be "a
gross and scandalous libel."[124] It was plainly evident that Mr.
Sherwood's mind was not equable, and that he was influenced by
considerations not properly before him. The fact that his son Henry, and
his brother-in-law, H. J. Boulton, had respectively been prosecuted for
riot and murder at Collins's instigation was too clearly held in
remembrance, insomuch that every point was strained to the utmost
against the defendant. Judge Sherwood, however, was absent from the
bench when the jury returned into Court with their verdict, his place
being taken by Judge Hagerman, who had many times been subjected to the
arrows of Collins's satire, and who was referred to with bantering
contumely in the very report which formed the subject of the present
prosecution. The jury, after deliberating about five hours, brought in a
verdict of "Guilty of a libel on the Attorney-General." The Clerk
recorded a general verdict of "Guilty," which was read to the jury. The
defendant's counsel objected to the recording of the verdict in this
form, inasmuch as the jury had found his client guilty of libel on the
Attorney-General only. A brief argument on the subject ensued, whereupon
the Judge charged the jury to the effect that such a verdict as they had
found could not be received. He informed them that if they found the
defendant guilty of any part of the alleged libel, they ought to return
a general verdict of "Guilty;" but that they might, if they thought
proper, suggest to the Court on what particular part of the publication
their verdict was founded, in which case the Court would confine the
punishment to that part only. The jury thereupon retired a second time,
but soon returned with a general verdict of "Guilty." On being asked by
the Judge whether they adhered to their former opinion as to the
libellous part of the publication, they answered in the affirmative.

The sentence of the Court was not pronounced until sufficient time had
elapsed to admit of a conference on the subject between Justices
Sherwood and Hagerman. That such a conference really took place is clear
enough from a letter of Judge Sherwood himself, to be presently referred
to. The sentence, when it came, created much surprise, not only in the
bosom of the individual who was directly concerned, but among the