al clemency by releasing the prisoner from his
melancholy situation. Sir John's reply was non-committal, but not wholly
discouraging. It conceded the advantages resulting from a free and
well-conducted press, but expressed reverence for trial by jury, and
referred to the danger of interfering with the verdicts of juries or the
opinions of Judges unless their illegality could be clearly
demonstrated. It added, however, that if his Excellency; after inquiring
into the case, should come to the conclusion that his interposition was
called for, a communication to that effect would be made to the person
chiefly concerned.

In the face of this reply, it behooved the prisoner and his friends to
wait a reasonable time before taking any further steps. Within the next
few days a number of facts came to light which certainly went to show
that there were at least good grounds for a new trial. It appeared that
John Hayden, one of the jurymen, had been ignorant of the true meaning
of the word "malignancy," and had sent out to the Court for Johnson's
Dictionary, in order to arrive at a true definition. This indulgence was
refused by the Court, and Hayden was constrained to accept the
definition of another juror, whereby he was led to believe that the word
in question has a much more serious significance than really attaches to
it. By this means he had been induced to give his voice for the
conviction of the defendant. Two other jurymen,[127] who were servile
tools of the Attorney-General, had been actuated by undue prejudice,
insomuch that they had expressed a strong pre-determination to convict
the defendant. Then, the conduct of Mr. Hagerman, in sitting as a Judge
in a case wherein he was personally concerned--it will be remembered
that he had been derisively referred to in the report which formed the
subject of the indictment--was an infringement of decency, to say
nothing of its being a perversion of the letter and spirit of the law.
He had also conferred with the Judge by whom the sentence was
pronounced as to the measure of punishment to be awarded. But he had
not only sat in judgment in his own cause: he had refused to record the
finding of the jury, whom he had misled and coerced into bringing in a
verdict contrary to what they really intended. Judge Sherwood's conduct
had been little better. He had delivered a charge to the jury which
practically left them no alternative but to convict, unless they
altogether disregarded his c